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ALLOCATION OF THE COST OF IMPROVEMENTS TO
REAL PROPERTY HELD IN TRUST
Trustees are frequently called upon to make expenditures upon
corporal of improved rental or commercial real property trusts. Cal-
ifornia law regulating the allocation of the cost of such expenditures
between income2 and principal,3 or more precisely between the bene-
ficiaries entitled to these funds-income beneficiary4 and remainder-
man5 -has been in a state of uncertainty since 1965. 6 As a result
trust officers have been reluctant to file accountings for fear of in-
curring personal liability. The California Legislature in its 1967 ses-
sion enacted legislation7 to meet this problem, and adopted a modi-
fied version of the 1962 revision of the Uniform Principal and In-
come Act. This note will first examine the context of the prob-
lem and the cause of the uncertain state of the law. Then the
relevant provisions of California's Revised Uniform Principal and
Income Act s will be discussed and evaluated as an effective tool for
trustees regarding the allocation of the cost of "improvement ex-
penditures."
The particular expenditures9 under consideration in this note
are those for improvements to trust corpora consisting of rental
or commercial real property. These are expenditures which change,
alter, or add to the land and which "alter its use or increase its
value and productivity."' 0 The major problem encountered in allo-
I "The trust property is sometimes called the trust res, the corpus, the
capital, the subject or subject-matter, of the trust." G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF
TRUSTS AND TRusTEES § 1, at 3 (2d ed. 1965).
2 "Income is the return in money or property derived from the use of
principal . . . ." Cal. Stats. 1967, ch. 1508, § 2 (operative July 1, 1968 as
CAL. CIv. CODE § 730.03 (a)).
3 "Principal is the property which has been set aside by the owner or
the person legally empowered so that it is held in trust eventually to be de-
livered to a remainderman while the return or use of the principal is in
the meantime taken or received by or held for accumulation for an income
beneficiary." Cal. Stats. 1967, ch. 1508, § 2 (operative July 1, 1968 as CAL.
Civ. CODE § 730.03(b)).
4 "'Income Beneficiary' means the person to whom income is presently
payable or for whom it is accumulated for distribution as income." Cal.
Stats. 1967, ch. 1508, § 2 (operative July 1, 1968 as CAL. CIV. CODE § 730.01(1)).
5 "'Remainderman' means the person entitled to principal, including
income which has been accumulated and added to principal." Cal. Stats.
1967, ch. 1508, § 2 (operative July 1, 1968 as CAL. CIv. CODE § 730.01(3)).
6 See text accompanying notes 28-53 infra.
7 Cal. Stats. 1967, ch. 776, § 1; Cal. Stats. 1967, ch. 1508, §§ 1-2 (operative
July 1, 1968 as CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 730-30.17).
8 Cal. Stats. 1967, ch. 1508, §§ 1-2 (operative July 1, 1968 as CAL. Civ.
CODE §§ 730-30.17).
9 "Expense and expenditure are not synonyms. An expense is the ex-
piration of value. An expenditure is an outlay of funds or an incurrence of
obligation. When a building is purchased, there is an expenditure. As it
is used up, there is expense." Note, Depreciation as a Trust Expense, 4 U.
FLA. L. REv. 41, 43 (1951); see P. MAsoN, S. DAVIDSON, & J. ScEmLER, FUNDA-
mENTALS OF AcCOUNTING 278-79 (4th ed. 1959).
10 G. BOGERT, supra note 1, § 600, at 356. Improvements should be dis-
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cating such "improvement expenditures" results from the fact that
these improvements depreciate in the course of time. If the entire
improvement cost was allocated to trust principal and the interest of
the income beneficiary does not terminate before the end of the use-
ful life of the improvement, the remainderman suffers an inequity.
Though he has paid the entire improvement cost, he receives an
asset at the termination of the income beneficiary's interest worth
substantially less than he paid. If, on the other hand, the entire
cost of the improvement was allocated to income and the interest of
the income beneficiary does terminate before the end of the useful
life of the improvement, the income beneficiary suffers the inequity.
Though he has paid the entire cost of the improvement, he receives
only part of the use. The problem the trustee faces, therefore, is
how to allocate equitably the cost of an "improvement expenditure"
which depreciates, i.e., for how much of the cost should each bene-
ficiary's interest be responsible?
This problem arises when instruments creating testamentary or
unamendable inter vivos trusts contain no expression of the settlor's
intent regarding such allocation. The settlor's intent is controlling
when expressed;11 in the absence of such expression, the trustee is
faced with the responsibility of allocating the cost of the expenditure
in a manner consistent with his duty to treat all beneficiaries im-
partially.'
2
In the absence of legislative or judicial rules, the trustee would
have three possible methods by which to pay the cost of "improve-
ment expenditures" from trust funds. These expenditures could be:
(1) paid entirely from principal; (2) paid entirely from income; (3)
divided between principal and income in some rational manner. As
has been stated above, the first two alternatives may result in in-
equities. The third method, which divides the cost between the bene-
ficiaries, has gained increasing prominence in statutory enactments 13
as well as the legal literature.14 This method is depreciation ac-
tinguished from repairs which "are designed merely to keep the res intact
and in its original condition, as nearly as possible." Id.; see 3 A. SCOTT, LAW
OF TRUSTS, §§ 176, 233 (2d ed. 1956); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS §§
176, 233 (1959).
11 The trustee must manage the trust "[iln accordance with the terms
of the trust instrument, notwithstanding contrary provisions of this chapter
.... " Cal. Stats. 1967, ch. 1508, § 2 (operative July 1, 1968 as CAL. CIv. CODE
§ 730.02 (a) (1)).
12 RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TRUSTS § 232 (1959).
'3 E.g., UmFoRM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT § 13 (a) (2) (revised 1962);
Cal. Stats. 1967, ch. 1508, § 2 (operative July 1, 1968 as CAL. CIV. CODE §
730.13(a) (2)); CoLo. REV. STATS. ANN. § 57-4-2 (1963); MCH. Comp. LAwS
ANN. § 555.63 (a) (2) (1967). See statutes cited note 96 infra.
14 Bogert, Uniform Principal and Income Act Revised, 101 TRUSTS &
ESTATES 787 (1962); Capron, Reserves Against the Depreciation of Real Prop-
erty Held by a Trustee, 12 Omo ST. L.J. 565 (1951); Dunham, Uniform Revised
Principal and Income Act: Discussion of Newly Promulgated Statute, 101
TRUSTS & ESTATES 894 (1962); Isaacs, Principal-Quantum or Res?, 46 HIAv.
L. REv. 776 (1933); Krasnowiecki, Existing Rules of Trust Administration:
A Stranglehold on the Trustee-Controlled Business Enterprise, 101 U. PA. L.
REv. (1962); Nossaman, The Uniform Principal and Income Act, 28 CALIF.
L. REv. 34 (1939); Note, Trusts-Powers and Obligations of Trustees-Trustee
of Improved Realty Must Set up a Reserve for Depreciation, 63 HARv. L. REV.
counting, and it must be explained at this point to enable the reader
to understand better the subsequent discussion concerning the de-
velopment of California's principal and income legislation.
In the context of allocating trust "improvement expenditures,"
depreciation accounting would provide that principal be initially
charged, but subsequently reimbursed by periodic payments out of
income. Modern accounting principles direct that the depreciation
charges against income are designed to spread the cost of an asset
over its useful life.15 The periodic deduction of such charges from
income and crediting them to principal over the expected useful
life of the improvement, returns to principal the improvement's
original cost. When the improvement is made, part of the trust prin-
cipal is transformed-changed from money into the substance of the
improvement. Depreciation charges against income are a means by
which the principal is again transformed as the improvement be-
comes less valuable-changed from the depreciating improvement
back into money. For example, if the trustee remodels a building
held in trust at a cost of $100,000, and the expected useful life of
the improvement is 10 years, the trustee, utilizing the straight-line
method of depreciation, should deduct from income and credit to
principal $10,000 annually during the continuance of the life estate.
In this manner, when the trust terminates, the remainderman either
receives the entire amount of the original principal, or the difference
is made up by the value of the partially depreciated improvement;
and the income beneficiary has not received the fruits of the im-
provement in the form of increased income without bearing a pro-
portionate share of its cost.
California law prior to the adoption of the Revised Uniform
Principal and Income Act allocated the cost of "improvement ex-
penditures" wholly to either income or principal, with no provision
180 (1949); Note, Allowance for Depreciation of Buildings Held in Trust for
Successive Beneficiaries, 60 HARv. L. REV. 952 (1947); Note, Trusts-Improved
Real Estate-Validity of Depreciation Reserves, 55 MCH. L. REv. 857 (1957);
Note, Trusts and Estates-Accumulations-Setting Aside Reserves for De-
preciation on Trust Buildings, 48 MCH. L. REv. 542 (1950); Note, Trusts-
Deduction of Depreciation Allowance from Income, 38 EMN. L. REV. 681
(1954); Note, Depreciation as a Trust Expense, 4 U. FLA. L. REv. 41 (1951);
Note, The Revised Uniform Principal and Income Act-Progress, But Not
Perfection, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 473 (1963); Note, Depreciation Charges Against
Trust Income, 14 N.Y.U. INTmR. L. REV. 32 (1958).
15 H. FINNEY & H. MILLER, PRINcIPLES OF AcCOUNTING 352-58 (5th ed.
1958); P. MAsoN, S. DAvInsON & J. ScINnLER, FUNDAmIENTALS OF AccouNTING
483-503 (4th ed. 1964).
The United States Supreme Court has defined depreciation as a "loss, not
restored by current maintenance, which is due to all the factors causing the
ultimate retirement of the property. These factors embrace wear and tear,
decay, inadequacy, and obsolescence." Lindheimer v. Illinois Tel. Co., 292
U.S. 151, 167 (1934).
The factors to be considered in estimating the amount to be periodically
charged as depreciation are the original cost, scrap value, and estimated life
of the improvement. The estimated life of an improvement to real property
is figured in years, and its intended use and provisions for upkeep are, among
others, important considerations. See, H. FINNEY, supra at 356-57.
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for dividing the cost between them.16 California's Revised Uniform
Principal and Income Act, however, does provide for apportionment
between the beneficiaries by means of depreciation allowances from
income.' 7 In order to appreciate California's new position, an under-
standing of the prior law and the forces leading to the enactment of
the new legislation is required. The development of the prior law
will be examined first, followed by a discussion of the forces lead-
ing to the adoption of California's Revised Act.
Development of California Law
Prior to 1941 the case law provided that ordinary, recurring, and
regular expenses incurred in the administration of a trust were
payable from income and that extraordinary or unusual expenses
were payable from principal.' 8 California codified the existing case
law and made its first statutory attempt to deal with the difficult
problems of allocating expenses and receipts between income and
principal in 1941.19 The legislature in that year adopted the Principal
and Income Act.20 It provided in section 12 that all "ordinary ex-
penses" including "ordinary repairs" were to be paid from income;
"improvements to real property" and all other expenses not payable
from income were to be paid from principal.2 1 The Act was a sub-
stantial adoption of the 1931 version of the Uniform Principal and
Income Act with one change of significance regarding this problem.
Section 12(4) of the Uniform Act was omitted from section 12 of
California's Act. This section of the Uniform Act provided that
when the cost of an improvement representing an addition of value to
the trust property was paid out of principal, the trustee must reserve
out of income and add to principal each year a sum equal to the cost
of the improvement divided by the number of years of reasonably
expected duration of the improvement. 22 The legislature did not
adopt any alternative provision to allow a means for dividing the
cost of "improvement expenditures" between the beneficiaries, and
the entire cost under California's Principal and Income Act was pay-
able from principal since it was an "improvement to real property."
In 1953 the legislature repealed the Principal and Income Act
and adopted the Principal and Income Law.23 The latter was also
based on the Uniform Act and, like the previous California enact-
ment, did not incorporate section 12(4) of the Uniform Act. Section
730.15 of the Principal and Income Law incorporated the provisions
16 Cal. Stats. 1941, ch. 898, § 12, at 2483, as amended, Cal. Stats. 1953, ch.
37, § 1, at 673 (CAL. Clv. CODE § 730.15 which is to be repealed July 1, 1968).
'7 Cal. Stats. 1967, ch. 1508, § 2 (operative July 1, 1968 as CAL. CIv. CODE
§ 730.13 (a) (2)).
18 Estate of Dare, 196 Cal. 29, 235 P. 725 (1925); Estate of Duffill, 188
Cal. 536, 206 P. 42 (1922); Estate of Gartenlaub, 185 Cal. 648, 198 P. 209
(1921).
19 Cal. Stats. 1941, ch. 898, §§ 1-15, at 2476-84.
20 Id.
21 Cal. Stats. 1941, ch. 898, § 12, at 2483.
22 UNIomv PICnIPAL AND INCOME ACT § 12(4) (1931).
23 Cal. Stats. 1953, ch. 37, § 1, at 666 (CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 730-30.15, which
is to be repealed July 1, 1968),
of section 12 of California's Principal and Income Act.24  The rule
governing the allocation of expenses was, under both of the Cal-
ifornia enactments, that "ordinary expenses" and "ordinary repairs"
were to be paid from income and extraordinary or unusual expenses
and "improvements" were payable from principal.25 It was there-
fore settled that if an expenditure was for an "improvement," its cost
was to be paid entirely from principal.
The Principal and Income Law embodied no provision for de-
preciation of improvements or other assets, except (1) section 730.09,
which provided for maintenance of trust principal used in continu-
ance of a business, 26 and (2) section 730.12, which provided special
treatment for property subject to depletion or wasting assets.2 7 Since
rental or commercial real property had been understood by trust
officers not to come within sections 730.09 and 730.12, it was the
general practice not to charge a reserve allowance for depreciation
against the income beneficiary of a trust consisting of such property
unless the trust instrument so provided.28 The California Legislature
included in the Principal and Income Law no express language re-
garding the application of depreciation accounting as a means of
allocating the cost of improvements upon rental or commercial real
property between beneficiaries.
Disruption of Established Trustee Practice
Disruption to the settled state of the law came at the end of 1965
with the California Supreme Court's ruling in Estate of Kelley.29
The principles announced in this decision were unexpected in light
of the existing law, and they provided the catalyst for rapidly en-
suing statutory changes. 0
In the Kelley case the decedent's estate included a lot and build-
ing which was leased to Roos Brothers as a clothing store. The
24 Cal. Stats. 1953, ch. 37, § 1, at 673 (CAL. CIV. CODE § 730.15, which is
to be repealed July 1, 1968).
25 Estate of Dare, 196 Cal. 29, 235 P. 725 (1925); Estate of Duffill, 188
Cal. 536, 206 P. 42 (1922); Estate of Gartenlaub, 185 Cal. 648, 198 P. 209
(1921); Estate of Lair, 52 Cal. App. 2d 222, 126 P.2d 133 (1942); see Estate
of Roberts, 27 Cal. 2d 70, 162 P.2d 630 (1945); Estate of Schiffman, 86 Cal.
App. 2d 638, 195 P.2d 484 (1948); Estate of Lopez, 79 Cal. App. 2d 399, 179
P.2d 621 (1947).
26 Cal. Stats. 1953, ch. 37, § 1, at 669 (CAL. Civ. CODE § 730.09, which is
to be repealed July 1, 1968).
27 Cal. Stats. 1953, ch. 37, § 1, at 671 (CAL. Civ. CODE § 730.12, which is
to be repealed July 1, 1968).
28 Memorandum from The State Bar of Calif. to the Comm. on Adminis-
tration of Justice of the State Bar of Calif., April 6, 1966, on file Hastings Law
Library; Letter from R.C. Schleh, Ass't Legislative Representative, State Bar
of Calif., to Governor Reagan, June 30, 1967, on file Hastings Law Library;
Letter from William T. Bagley, Chairman, Calif. State Assembly Comm. on
Judiciary, to Governor Reagan, June 30, 1967, on file Hastings Law Library;
Calif. Comm. on Uniform State Laws, Comments on Uniform Principal and
Income Act (revised 1962), Nov. 4, 1964, on file Hastings Law Library; State
Bar of Calif., Comm. on Administration of Justice, Interim Report No. A-I-li
(b) (1967), on file Hastings Law Library.
29 63 Cal. 2d 679, 408 P.2d 353, 47 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1965).
30 See material cited note 28 supra,
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property was devised to T1, T 2 and his wife, to hold as trustees of
four separate trusts which were to pay an undivided 55 percent of
income to testator's wife and an undivided 15 percent of income to
each of the testator's three children. Upon the death of the wife all
trusts were to terminate, and each child was to receive an undivided
one-third interest in the entire trust property. The will authorized
a majority of the trustees to dispose of any of the trust property
and to reinvest the proceeds. The will contained no instructions
as to how trust expenses should be allocated between principal and
income.
3 1
Upon the expiration of the original lease in 1960, trustees T, and
T2 over the objection of the wife, entered into a new lease with
Roos Brothers for a 20-year term. The lease required the trustees to
spend $125,000 to remodel the store, and $75,000 to design, purchase,
and install new fixtures. The $200,000 was obtained by a loan se-
cured by a deed of trust on the building, repayable, including in-
terest, in 20 years.
32
On August 6, 1963, the wife filed a trustee's petition for instruc-
tions as to how the cost of the improvements should be apportioned
between principal and income. On January 2, 1964, the court entered
its order directing (1) that the payments on the part of the loan
allocated to fixtures be charged, both as to principal and interest,
against current income, and (2) that the payments of the part allo-
cated to improvements and modernization of the building be charged
against trust principal to the extent they represent repayment of the
loan principal and charged against trust income to the extent they
represent interest on the loan.
33
All the beneficiaries appealed. The wife contended that the
amortization of the part of the loan principal allocated to fixtures
was in error because the fixtures were not "ordinary repairs" within
the meaning of section 730.15(1) of the Civil Code.3 4 The remain-
dermen contended that it was error to apportion any principal pay-
ments to them because all the work was within the "ordinary re-
pair" provision of section 730.15 (1).35
The Supreme Court of California held that the improvements
and fixtures were not "ordinary repairs" within the meaning of
the Principal and Income Law and directed that these expenditures
be paid from trust principal. 6 However, the court unexpectedly
went on to require that depreciation deductions be made from income
and accredited to principal because such deductions were "ordinary
expenses" within the meaning of section 730.15 of the Civil Code.3 7
31 63 Cal. 2d at 682, 408 P.2d at 355, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 899.
32 Id. at 683, 408 P.2d at 355, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 899.
83 Id. at 684, 408 P.2d at 357, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 900.
34 Id. at 685, 408 P.2d at 356, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 900.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 685, 408 P.2d at 357, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 901.
37 "The improvement generated additional income for the life benefi-
ciary, but if it depreciates in value with the passage of time, it will not
benefit the remaindermen unless the trust terminates before the end of the
useful life of the improvement. To require the remaindermen to pay the
entire cost of a trust activity undertaken for the benefit of all the benefi-
ciaries would contravene both the intent of the testator and the express
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
The court concluded that the proper manner in which to allocate
the cost of the improvements would be for the trustee "to establish
a depreciation schedule under which the improvements to the build-
ing, including fixtures, [would] be depreciated on a straight line basis
over their anticipated useful life."38
The decision was based on several grounds. First, it was stated
that since trust property used in continuance of a trade or business
was depreciable under section 730.09 of the Civil Code, and since
rental or commercial property could not be meaningfully dis-
tinguished from property used in trade or business, rental and com-
mercial property should be depreciable in a similar manner.3 9 Sec-
ond, it was stated, that unless the testator clearly indicated a con-
trary intent, the trustee must prevent the impairment of the principal
since depletion of the trust principal tends to frustrate the funda-
mental purpose of the trust.4 0 Third, the court cited 41 with approval
section 13(a) (2) of the Revised Uniform Principal and Income Act
which furnished a method for preventing the impairment of trust
principal by providing for a compulsory "allowance for depreciation
on property subject to depreciation.142
There are several reasons why the principles announced in the
Kelley case were unexpected. First, the court's statement that the
trustee must administer the trust consisting of rental or commer-
cial real estate as a business, "allocating expenses in accordance with
accepted accounting principles" was inconsistent with prior law.43
The word "business" conveys many meanings, and when used in a
statute its meaning depends upon the context as well as the objec-
tive of the statute.44 It is open to doubt whether rental or commer-
cial real property qualifies as "business" within the meaning of sec-
tion 730.09 of the Civil Code.4 5 The court, moreover, did not state
that obtaining income from rental or commercial real property was
provisions of the Principal and Income Law that ordinary expenses of trust
management be met by income." Id. at 686, 408 P.2d at 357, 47 Cal. Rptr. at
901 (emphasis added).
38 Id. at 689, 408 P.2d at 359, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 903.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 688, 408 P.2d at 358, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 902.
41 Id.
42 UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT § 13 (a) (2) (revised 1962). This
section provides:
"(a) The following charges shall be made against income:
(2) a reasonable allowance for depreciation on property subject to de-
preciation under generally accepted accounting principles .. .
43 See material cited note 28 supra.
44 Grand Forks Herald, Inc. v. Lyons, 101 N.W.2d 543 (1960); City of
Lewiston v. Mathewson, 78 Idaho 347, 303 P.2d 680 (1956); People ex rel.
Nauss v. Groves, 283 N.Y. 383, 28 N.E.2d 881 (1940).
45 Problems have been encountered in an attempt to define "business"
as used in the Principal and Income Law context. It has been reported,
"[s] everal suggestions were made that we [draftsmen of the Revised Uniform
Principal and Income Act] should try to draft a section that determined when
[the trustee] is in business and we decided we could not do so." Dunham,
supra note 14, at 897; cf. Krosnowiecki, supra note 14; Note, Depreciation as
a Trust Expense, 4 U, FLA, L. R1V. 41 (1951),
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"business," but rather that it should be administered in a similar
manner since it could not "be meaningfully distinguished from prop-
erty used in trade or business." 46 Second, the court's statement of
the testator's presumed intent, requiring preservation of the princi-
pal, was surprising.47 Previously, the majority of the trust cases
which had considered the question had said that from the point of
view of intent of the settlor and the equities involved, it was im-
proper, in the absence of a contrary provision in the trust instru-
ment, to reserve a portion of the income for depreciation.48 And
finally, the reliance placed on the provisions of section 13(a) (2) of
the Revised Uniform Act was surprising because it was not law in
California when Kelley was decided and, indeed, it was inconsistent
with established California law and practice.49
An equitable principle regarding the allocation of the cost of
"improvement expenditures" was announced in the Kelley case. The
court stated the principle in this language:
Charging depreciation based on the value of the improvements and
calculated over the anticipated useful life of the improvements ...
will allocate the expense between income beneficiary and remain-
dermen in a manner properly reflecting the benefit to each.5 0
In propounding this principle the court appeared to be more con-
cerned with reaching an equitable result than following established
trust practice.
Reacijon to Estate of Kelley
The Kelley decision was the first judicial interpretation of the
Principal and Income Law as applied to the propriety of using
depreciation allowances from income to pay for improvements to
trust corpus. It was a great shock to trust officers because it con-
travened the assumption under which those involved with trust ad-
ministration had been working, namely, that depreciation would not
be charged against the income beneficiary unless the trust instru-
40 63 Cal. 2d at 687, 408 P.2d at 359, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 903.
47 See material cited note 28 supra.
48 New York, where the majority of cases dealing with the propriety of
deducting depreciation allowances from income have been heard, holds that
the trustee may not withhold such allowances. See, e.g., In re McCullough's
Will, 154 N.Y.S.2d 517 (Sur. Ct. 1956); In re Abeloff's Estate, 108 N.Y.S.2d 39
(Sur. Ct. 1951); In re Ball's Will, 197 Misc. 1047, 96 N.Y.S.2d 201 (Sur. Ct.
1950); In re Edgar's Will, 157 Misc. 10, 282 N.Y.S. 795 (Sur. Ct. 1935). Two
cases decided by Surrogate McGarey are contra: In re Kaplan's Will, 195
Misc. 132, 88 N.Y.S.2d 851 (Sur. Ct. 1949); In re Dahlamann's Estate, 95 N.Y.S.
2d 74 (Sur. Ct. 1949). These last two cases held that the trustee must with-
hold a depreciation allowance from income for improved real property unless
the trust instrument or will specifically directed otherwise. Later New York
cases have not followed Surrogate McGarey's rationale.
Most other courts which have dealt with the problem follow the New
York rule. E.g., Evans v. Ockershausen, 100 F.2d 695 (D.C. Cir. 1938), cert.
denied, 306 U.S. 633 (1939); Nelligan v. Long, 320 Mass. 439, 70 N.E.2d 175
(1946); In re Roth's Estate, 139 N.J. Eq. 588, 52 A.2d 811 (1947). See cases
collected: G. BoGERT, supra note 1, § 600 n.61, at 367; 3 A. ScoTT, supra note 10,
§ 239.4, at 1870.
49 See material cited note 28 supra.
50 63 Cal. 2d at 687, 408 P.2d at 358, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 902.
ment so provided.51 Trust officers generally did not quarrel with
the abstract rationale of the court; rather, they were apprehensive
about the implications of the decision in light of established trust
practice. 52 The Kelley case by way of dictum stated that deprecia-
tion reserves have to be established not only for improvements added
by the trustee subsequent to the establishment of the trust, but also
for assets which were a part of the original trust principal.
53
Trust officers feared that the decision would apply retroactively to
real estate trusts already in existence when the decision was an-
nounced, thereby requiring them to account for reserves to date
from the time of establishment of such trusts.
54
The fear of retroactivity was in part caused by the holding in
Estate of De Laveaga.55 In that case the executrix of the life bene-
ficiary of a testamentary trust recovered a judgment for predistribu-
tion income (i.e. income earned between the time of death and time
of decree of distribution) which had never been paid to the life
beneficiary. The judgment was recovered despite 11 prior court-ap-
proved accountings. The court held that the decree of distribution
and the accountings were res judicata only to those matters spe-
cifically stated therein.5 6 It was explained that, since neither the
decree of distribution nor the accountings stated that all assets were
being treated as principal, the claim to predistribution income could
be litigated, notwithstanding that it was readily apparent in all the
accountings that the entire fund was being treated as principal.
5 7
When the principles announced in Kelley and Delaveaga are con-
sidered together, the problem that confronted trust officers becomes
apparent. The remaindermen of existing testamentary or unamend-
able5s inter vivos real estate trusts had these two cases as authority
to demand that trustees account for depreciation reserves which
had not been established. The trustees could be held liable even
though there might have been prior, court-approved accountings con-
taining no provision for such reserves.59 This liability would result
despite the likelihood that the affected trusts were drafted upon
the assumption that depreciation allowances were to be charged
against income only when expressly provided in the trust instrument.
In addition, applying to those trusts the principles announced in the
5 See material cited note 28 supra.
52 "The State's Trust Officers do not necessarily quarrel with the reason-
ing or the main thrust of the decision, but are seriously concerned at the
practical effects resulting from this unexpected change in the law." Memo-
randum from The State Bar of Calif. to the Comm. on Administration of
Justice of the State Bar of Calif., April 6, 1967, on file Hastings Law Library;
see 1967-1968 CALrWORNiA BANKmRS AsSOCIATION TRuST DivisioN BULL. No. 5.
53 63 Cal. 2d at 688, 408 P.2d at 358, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 902.
54 See material cited note 28 supra.
55 50 Cal. 2d 480, 326 P.2d 129 (1958).
56 Id. at 486-87, 326 P.2d at 132.
57 Id. at 486-88, 326 P.2d at 132-33.
58 Amendable trusts could have been changed to provide that no depre-
ciation reserve shall be established, and thereby escape the holding of Kelley.
63 Cal. 2d at 689, 408 P.2d at 359, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 903.
59 See Estate of De Laveaga, 50 Cal. 2d 480, 487-88, 326 P.2d 129, 132-33
(1958).
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Kelley case would often be against the settlor's unexpressed intent.60
The fears of trust officers were expressed through the Calif-
ornia Bankers Association, which was concerned with the practical
effects of the "unexpected change" in the law.61 The State Bar of
California in cooperation with the California Bankers Association
proposed the Kelley bill, 6 2 which was introduced into the State
Assembly on April 4, 1967.63 The bill was intended to protect the
trustees from personal liability, and also to allow the continuance of
previous practice regarding the nonuse of depreciation reserves in
the management of the trusts. 6 4 The bill provided:
The trustee of any trust created by will or other instrument shall not
be required to set aside a reserve or allowance from trust income for
depreciation or depletion on any property held in such trust unless
the will or instrument expressly requires such a reserve or allow-
ance.0 5
The Kelley bill was designed to provide an immediate solution
for the trustee. This "stop gap" measure was chosen because "scores,
if not hundreds" of trust accountings were being postponed due to
the confusion generated by the Kelley decision.66 The California
Bankers Association knew that the legislature was considering a
complete revision of the Principal and Income Law,6 7 but believed
that, since the revision was extensive and complicated, passage could
not be anticipated soon enough to aid the settlement of accounts.68
The Kelley bill met no organized opposition and was enacted into
law in only 12 weeks.0 9
The second piece of legislation affecting this problem came un-
expectedly soon. The legislature, a few weeks after passing the
Kelley bill, repealed the Principal and Income Law and adopted
60 Interview with C.E. DeRochie, Vice President and Operations Officer
for Trusts, Bank of America, in San Francisco, Dec. 4, 1967.
61 1967-1968 CALIFoRNIA BAN:ERs AssocIATIoN BULL. No. 11; see State
Bar of Calif., Comm. on the Administration of Justice, Comm. Report, 42 CAL.
ST. BAR J. 708, 709 (1967).
02 State Bar of Calif., Comm. on the Administration of Justice, Interim
Report No. A-i-li(b) (1967), on file Hastings Law Library.
03 CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE, ASSE MLY WEEKLY HIsTORY, No. 127, at 453
(July 21, 1967).
04 Memorandum from the State Bar of Calif. to the Comm. on Adminis-
tration of Justice of the State Bar of Calif., April 6, 1966, on file Hastings
Law Library; see 1967-1968 CAlF. BANKERS AssocIATioN BULL. No. 11; State
Bar of Calif., Comm. on the Administration of Justice, Interim Report No.
A-1-li (b) (1967), on file Hastings Law Library.
03 Cal. Stats. 1967, ch. 776, § 1 (emphasis added).
60 Memorandum from The State Bar of Calif. to the Committee on Ad-
ministration of Justice of The State Bar of Calif., April 6, 1966, on file Hast-
ings Law Library.
07 A modified version of the Revised Uniform Principal and Income Act
was introduced into the State Assembly on Feb. 28, 1967. CA=F. LEGISLATURE,
ASSEM LY WEEKLY HISTORY, No. 37, at 144 (March 2, 1967).
08 State Bar of Calif., Comm. on the Administration of Justice, Interim
Report No. A-1-l1(b) (1967), on file Hastings Law Library.
69 Letter from William T. Bagley, Chairman, California State Assembly
Comm. on Judiciary, to Governor Reagan, June 30, 1967, on file Hastings Law
Library; CALir. LEGISLATURE, ASSEmBLY WEEKLY HISToRY, No. 127, at 453
(July 21, 1967).
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a modified version of the Revised Uniform Principal and Income
ActYo
California Revised Uniform Principal and Income Act
California's Revised Uniform Principal and Income Act becomes
effective on July 1, 1968. The relevant sections provide that "[e] xtra-
ordinary repairs" or "expenses incurred in making a capital im-
provement to principal" shall be charged against principal.71 How-
ever, the trustee in his "absolute discretion"' "may establish an allow-
ance for depreciation out of income" for improvements which are
"subject to depreciation under generally accepted accounting prin-
ciples.17 2 When the legislature adopted the California Revised Uni-
form Act, it was changed in one important respect. The modification
concerns the use of the depreciation allowances. 73 The Revised
Uniform Act provides that a reserve for depreciation shall be made
for property subject to depreciation.7 4 California's version provides
that a reserve for depreciation may, in the "absolute discretion" of
the trustee, be made for such property.
7 5
The enactment of the Revised Uniform Act is the first statu-
tory recognition in California of the use of depreciation allowances
to allocate and apportion the cost of "improvement expenditures"
between successive beneficiaries. The cost would be initially allo-
cated to principal, and the trustee, acting pursuant to the grant of
"absolute discretion," can provide for depreciation allowances from
income.76 These allowances may be utilized to apportion "improve-
ment expenditures" between the beneficiaries. On the other hand,
the trustee has discretion to refrain from deducting such allowances
from income when conditions, in his judgment, make it inequitable
or undesirable to do so. The "absolute discretion" granted the
trustee modifies the prior law as established in the Kelley case. The
Kelley case held that depreciation allowances were required, where-
as California's Revised Uniform Act provides that such allowances
are not required, but are merely discretionary with the trustee.
70 Cal. Stats. 1967, ch. 1508, §§ 1-2 (operative July 1, 1968 as CAL. Civ.
CODE §§ 730-30.17).
71 Cal. Stats. 1967, ch. 1508, § 2 (operative July 1, 1968 as CAL. CIv. CODE
§ 730.13 (c) (3)).
72 Cal. Stats. 1967, ch. 1508, § 2 (operative July 1, 1968 as CAL. Civ. CODE
8§ 730.13(c) (3), 730.13(a) (2)).
73 The State Bar of California and the California Bankers Association
were largely responsible for the modification and the resulting provision
granting the trustee "absolute discretion." The provision of the Revised Uni-
form Act was inconsistent with prior trust practice in the State and the
Bankers Association and the State Bar did not favor changing California law
to the extent suggested in the mandatory depreciation provision of section 13
(a) (2). Letter from C.P. Von Herzin, member Calif. Comm. on Uniform
State Laws, to the author, Oct. 24, 1967, on file Hastings Law Library.
74 UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT § 13 (a) (2) (revised 1962).
75 Cal. Stats. 1967, ch. 1508, § 2 (operative July 1, 1968 at CAL. CiV.
CODE § 730.13 (a) (2)).
76 Section 730.14 of California's Revised Uniform Principal and Income
Act assimilates the provisions of the Kelley bill, but restricts its application to
enumerated provisions. Cal. Stats. 1967, ch. 1508, § 1 (operative July 1, 1968
as CAL. CIV. CODE § 730.14).
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Alternative Methods Available
To evaluate adequately the merits of California's new method of
treating the allocation of "improvement expenditures," the alterna-
tive methods available to the legislature must be examined. Such
alternatives are found in the Restatement (Second) of Trusts77 and
in the Revised Uniform Principal and Income Act.
7 8
The Restatement treats the problem of allocating "improvement
expenditure" between successive beneficiaries under two different
sections: one dealing with allocation of expenses 79 and the other
with wasting assets.80 Section 233 in dealing with allocation of ex-
penses provides that: (1) "ordinary repairs" are payable from in-
come, and (2) "improvements" are payable from principal, except
"temporary improvements" which are to be amortized8 ' from income.
The rationale of this provision is that, if the improvement is "per-
manent," it merely represents a change in the form of the principal
which the remainderman will receive when the interest of the income
beneficiary terminates. The remainderman is therefore not harmed
by having the "improvement expenditure" paid from principal.8 2 The
income beneficiary bears a share of the cost to offset the increase in
income, since he loses income which would have been earned from
that portion of the principal which was expended for the improve-
ment.8 3 If the improvement is not permanent in character, but is of
limited duration, the income beneficiary will probably receive the full
benefit and he, not the remainderman, should be required to bear
the cost. 4 The result is that, if the trust terminates before the end
of the estimated life of the "temporary improvement," the income
beneficiary, by means of periodic payments into principal, will have
paid a share of the improvement cost proportionate to the benefits
received. "If the trust does not terminate before the end of the esti-
mated life of the improvement, the entire cost will be paid from
income."88
77 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRuSTs §§ 233, 239 (1959).
78 UNuoimu PRIwciPAL AND INCOME ACT § 13 (revised 1962).
79 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 233 (1959).
80 Id. § 239, at 586.
81 Amortization is the operation of paying off an indebtedness by install-
ments. An amortization plan, in the context of this problem, refers to the
method by which the principal of a trust is reimbursed from income for an
expenditure initially charged against the principal. The amount of each in-
stallment is determined by the cost of the asset and the length of the period
within which such cost is to be repaid. An amortization plan may utilize
any period within which to effectuate the repayment. A depreciation plan,
on the other hand, utilizes the estimated life of the asset as the repayment
period. When an expenditure is required to be "amortized" from income, it
is clear that the one charged with such duty is not required to utilize a de-
preciation plan, but is free to use any installment method which will spread
the cost over a period of time. See generally H. FINNEy, supra note 15, at
352-58; P. MAsON, supra note 15, at 483-503.
82 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 233, Comments i- (1959).
83 The income beneficiary will also bear a share of the cost if the im-
provement is paid from nontrust capital. The interest on the borrowed funds
is an "ordinary expense" and payable from income.
84 RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TRUSTS § 233, Comments i-1 (1959).
85 Id. § 233, Comment 1, at 561 (emphasis added).
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Under section 239 of the Restatement, which deals principally
with wasting assets, the trustee may be required to make provision
for amortization of buildings or other improvements to real property
if held as part of the original trust principal.86 Comment h to this
section deals with "improvement expenditures" and states that where
"the trustee acting within his powers erects a building or makes im-
provements, the cost is payable out of principal, but the trustee is
ordinarily under a duty to set up a reserve for depreciation."8 7 Thus,
comment h indicates that buildings and improvements erected by
the trustee are "ordinarily" depreciable.
The principle announced in comment h to section 239, however,
is contradicted by the implications of section 233. Under section 233
most buildings and many other improvements erected by the trustee
are treated as "permanent improvements" and, therefore, are not
amortizable or depreciable under the provisions of this section." A
great deal of the confusion encountered in attempting to reconcile
these two inconsistent sections results from the incidental treatment
which the principles of depreciation accounting receive in the Restate-
ment. It appears that either the draftsmen could not agree on the
proper function and applicability of depreciation accounting or that
it was an afterthought of a principle which was not fully developed
when the Restatement was drafted and was merely "tacked on" to
these sections.8 9
Not only is there inconsistency within the provisions of the
Restatement, but the widely utilized tests for allocating expenses em-
bodied in section 233 are not easily applied. It has been difficult for
the courts to distinguish "repairs" from "improvements," 90 and when
"improvements" are required to be further distinguished on the basis
of permanency (as either "permanent" or "temporary") for the pur-
pose of apportioning "improvement expenditures" between income
beneficiary and remainderman the task becomes even more diffi-
cult.91 Professor Bogert has noted the difficulty encountered in
attempting to apply such standards to actual fact situations, and
86 Id. § 239, Comment h, at 591.
87 Id. (emphasis added).
88 See Krasnowiecki, supra note 14, at 530.
89 See Id. at 524.
90 Compare Estate of Miller, 175 Misc. 583, 24 N.Y.S.2d 503 (Sur. Ct. 1940)
(new flooring chargeable to principal); In re Bowers' Will, 270 App. Div.
1060 (1946) (part of the cost for renovation of windows chargeable to prin-
cipal); In re Jackson's Will, 135 Misc. 329, 239 N.Y.S. 362 (Sur. Ct. 1929),
afi'd, 232 App. Div. 425, 250 N.Y.S. 324 (1931), rev'd on other grounds, 258
N.Y. 281, 179 N.E. 496 (1932) (reroofing chargeable to principal), with Estate
of Daily, 117 Mont. 194, 159 P.2d 327 (1945) (new flooring not chargeable to
principal); In re Boyd, 231 Iowa 1325, 4 N.W.2d 387 (1942) (altering size of
windows, frames, and screens not chargeable to principal); Estate of Roth,
139 N.J. Eq. 588, 52 A.2d 811 (Ch. Ct. 1947) (reroofing not chargeable to,
principal). See cases collected Annot., 128 A.L.R. 199, 295 (1940); Annot.,
175 A.L.R. 1434, 1458 (1948).
91 Krasnowiecki, supra note 14, at 526, and cases there collected.
Professor Bogert and Professor Scott seem to feel that in determining
what is "permanent" the duration of the improvement should be compared
with the duration of the trust. G. BoGaR, supra note 1, § 601, at 382; 3 A.
ScowT, supra note 10, § 233.3, at 1759.
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has concluded that the courts do not consider as binding the label or
name attached to a particular expense.
9 2
The Restatement in sections 233 and 239 has attempted to provide
for the equitable allocation of improvement expenditures between
the beneficiaries, but has done so at the cost of economically efficient
trust management. The chance for disagreement as to the classifi-
cation of an improvement, as either "temporary" or "permanent,"
seems great, and troublesome, expensive litigation may often be re-
quired to settle the dispute.9 3 The provisions of the Restatement are
not well suited for statutory guidelines which will enable trustees
to act pursuant to them with confidence and certainty.
The second alternative is found in section 13 (a) (2) of the Revised
Uniform Principal and Income Act which California modified. Sec-
tion 13 (a) (2), which provides for mandatory depreciation deductions
from income, was not adopted by the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws without a great deal of argu-
ment.9 4 Many draftsmen were opposed to the creation of such de-
preciation reserves because they felt such a practice would be con-
trary to well-estabIished law as well as the settlor's usual intent.9 5
This provision attempts to bring existing law into conformity with
modern accounting principles and business practice which require
such reserves. This section has been adopted by nine of the 11 states
which have adopted major portions of the Revised Uniform Act.9 0
The Revised Uniform Act was designed to aid the "simplicity
and convenience of administration" of the trust and, although con-
sidered, "fairness to all beneficiaries" was not given equal impor-
tance.9 7 The administrative and semantic problems encountered with
the Restatement's rules have been avoided in section 13 (a) (2) of this
Act. Section 13(a) (2) is a rigid and mandatory rule, however, and it
appears that the balance between simplicity and fairness has been
heavily weighed in the favor of simple administration. The rigidity
of the provision could at times work a hardship on the income bene-
92 Professor Bogert's exact language was: "Admittedly the decisions
regarding the sources from which expenses shall be paid are not all reconcil-
iable on the grounds of logic or consistency. The courts seek to work out
substantial justice between income and capital on the basis of the facts and
circumstances of each case, without feeling bound to follow precedent in all
instances or being controlled by the name given to the particular item of
expense under consideration" G. BOGERT, supra. note 1, § 802, at 139.
93 See material cited notes 90, 91 supra.
94 See Bogert, Uniform Principal and Income Act Revised, 101 TRUSTS &
ESTATES 787 (1962).
95 Id. at 788.
96 The following state stdtutes embody section 13 (a) (2) of the Uniform
Principal and Income Act (revised 1962): CoLo. REV. STATS. AwN. § 57-4-2
(1963); IDAHo CODE AN. § 68-1013 (1949); KAN. STATS. ANN. § 58-912 (1965);
LA. REV. STATS. § 2156 (1961); MD. ANN. CODE art. 75B § 11 (1957); MIcH.
Covn. LAws ANN. § 555.63 (1967); Mss. CODE ANN. § 672-183 (1942); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 67-517 (1962); Wyo. STATS. ANN. § 34-386 (1957).
New York and California rejected section 13(a) (2); see N.Y. PERs. PROP.
LAw § 27L (McKinney 1962); Cal. Stats. 1967, ch. 1508, § 2 (operative July 1,
1968 as CAL. Civ. CODE § 730.13).
97 Commissioners' Prefatory Note to Uromi PmNciPL AND INcoME ACT
(revised 1962), 9B UE~oam LAws ANN. 569, 570 (1966).
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ficiary since the depreciation deductions from income must always
be made, and no latitude is given for alternative action which
could be necessitated by peculiar or unforeseen circumstances. This
is true especially where the trust principal is small and the income
received therefrom is also relatively small.9 8 One writer in the field
has stated that there are undoubtedly many cases where such a
depreciation reserve should be established; but that in many others
it would place undue hardship upon the life beneficiaries; and that it
should not be too difficult for a trustee to determine when such a
reserve should be made.9  Professor Scott, speaking about build-
ings and depreciation reserves, has observed that rigidity is not de-
sirable:
Where the trust estate includes a building ... it would seem that it
should depend on the circumstances whether the trustee can properly
set aside a part of the income of the trust estate as a reserve for dep-
reciation .... Even though the character of the building is such
that ordinarily the trustee would be under a duty to set aside a re-
serve for depreciation, it would seem that circumstances may arise
under which he might refrain from setting aside such a reserve.100
The method adopted by California to allocate and apportion "im-
provement expenditures" appears to have incorporated the best as-
pects of both of these alternatives. The advantages offered by the
Restatement (Second) of Trusts, i.e. equitable treatment of successive
beneficiaries, can be achieved without sacrificing efficient trust man-
agement. California does this by giving the trustee "absolute dis-
cretion" concerning the use of depreciation allowances. The Revised
Uniform Principal and Income Act contributed depreciation account-
ing principles to California's new Act, and these principles have been
assimilated without the undesirable rigidity.
Discretionary power in the trustee gives flexibility which is
needed to ensure the equitable allocation of the cost of improve-
ments in conformity with existing conditions. When confronted
with an "improvement expenditure," the trustee faces factual prob-
lems. California's provision allows the trustee to deal with the factual
problems from a position close to all the factors and circumstances
which should be considered. The trustee is ordinarily familiar with
the wants and needs of the beneficiaries as well as the settlor's
intent, and with this knowledge he can fulfill the needs of the bene-
ficiaries in a manner consistent with the settlor's desires. The oppor-
tunity to review periodically the depreciation rate and the size of
the fund should aid in ensuring a just result for all beneficiaries.
Guidelines for Trustees
The trustee will be required to operate under the new law which
gives him "absolute discretion" in the use of depreciation allowances,
but he is not told the nature and extent of his power. In order to
ensure equitable treatment of the successive beneficiaries and effi-
cient trust management, the trustee must be apprised of what con-
98 See 3 A. ScoTT, supra note 10, § 239.4, at 1870-74 (giving specific in-
stances where such reserves should not be established).
99 Capron, Reserves Against the Depreciation of Real Property Held by a
Trustee, 12 OHO ST. L.J. 565 (1951).
100 3 A. ScoTT, supra note 10, § 239.4, at 1874.
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stitutes legitimate exercise of this "absolute discretion."
Under California case law10 ' and statute 02 it has been established
that actions pursuant to "absolute discretion" conferred upon the
trustee by a trust instrument cannot be judicially reviewed on the
basis of unsoundness of judgment. The trustee's action can be re-
viewed only on the basis of "fraud or bad faith,"'0 3 or where it is
found that he acted "in a state of mind not contemplated by the
settlor."1
04
The absolute discretion granted by California's Revised Uniform
Act should be governed by the same principles. There is no generic
difference between this discretion when granted by trust instrument
and when granted by statute. Judicial acceptance of the application
of the above principles to the "absolute discretion" granted by Cal-
ifornia's new statute would have a desirable effect upon trust ad-
ministration. Fear of judicial reversal and personal liability could
otherwise inhibit the equitable management of a trust and also ne-
gate, to some extent, the benefit and flexibility derived from the dis-
cretionary power.10 5 The possibility of a threatened suit for breach
of discretion might cause the trustee to select a course of action with
respect to apportionment of "improvement expenditures" which
would not be objectively determined nor equitable to all beneficiaries.
The branch of trust law which regulates the allocation of "im-
provement expenditures" between income beneficiary and remainder-
man does not lend itself to the application of technical rules or
standards. It lends itself, rather, to the application of equitable prin-
ciples. The Supreme Court of California in Estate of Kelley applied
the equitable principle of apportioning the cost of an "improvement
expenditure" according to the benefit received. This principle pro-
vides a general guideline which the trustee, within the "absolute
discretion" granted by California's Revised Uniform Act, can follow
in the use of depreciation allowances to allocate "improvement ex-
penditures."
This principle should be relied upon in two distinct stages: first,
to determine whether the trustee should utilize depreciation allow-
ances, and second, if he does utilize such reserves, to determine the
nature of the depreciation schedule established. 10 6 In apportioning
101 Estate of Heard, 107 Cal. App. 2d 225, 236 P.2d 810, 814 (1951); Estate
of Cranfield, 80 Cal. App. 2d 443, 450, 181 P.2d 732, 736 (1947); see Estate of
Gross, 216 Cal. App. 2d 563, 567, 31 Cal. Rptr. 281, 283 (1963); Estate of
Traung, 207 Cal. App. 2d 818, 834, 24 Cal. Rptr. 872, 882 (1962).
102 "A discretionary power conferred upon a trustee is presumed not to
be left to his arbitrary discretion, but may be controlled by the proper court
if not reasonably exercised, unless an absolute discretion is clearly conferred
by the declaration of trust." CAL. Cw. CODE § 2269.
103 Campbell v. Golsom, 70 Cal. App. 2d 309, 312, 160 P.2d 906, 908 (1945).
104 RESTATEMSENT (SECOND) OF TRuSTS § 187, Comment j (1959).
105 Interview with C.E. DeRochie, Vice President and Operations Officer
for Trusts, Bank of America, in San Francisco, Dec. 4, 1967.
106 There are four major depreciation methods. The straight-line method
provides for constant depreciation charges throughout the estimated useful
life of the asset. The use or production method provides for varying charges
for assets which are not used uniformly. The declining-balance method and
sum of the years digits method provide for large initial charges which grad-
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an "improvement expenditure," the trustee should measure the value
of the increase in income against the value expected to accrue to the
remainderman. 10 7 He should then provide an apportionment or allo-
cation of the cost in proportion to these benefits by means of a de-
preciation allowance. Depreciation allowances from income ordi-
narily should be made in order to ensure that each beneficiary
pays his proportionate share. Occasionally, however, by analyzing
the personalities and objectives involved, the particular trust corpus,
and the external economic conditions, the trustee might decide that
such a deduction should not be made.'0 8 As observed by Professor
Scott:
The rules as to setting aside a reserve for depreciation should not be
hard and fast rules, but should be subject to reasonable limitations
in the light of all existing conditions.' 0 9
"ES] ettlors have not always foreseen the multitude of problems
which may have to be faced and even draftsmen have found it diffi-
cult to foresee all possible kinds of receipts and disbursements." 110
The task of equitably allocating "improvement expenditures" is left
to the trustee with the tools of California's Revised Uniform Act and
the guidance of the equitable principle of the Kelley case to point
the way.
Craig S. Ritchey*
ually decrease for assets which lose efficiency and earning power as they
grow older. For a detailed discussion, see H. FINNFY, supra note 15, at 358-71;
P. MASON, supra note 9, at 489-92.
107 Cf. Jordan v. Jordan, 192 Mass. 337, 342-43, 78 N.E. 459, 460 (1906);
Little v. Little, 161 Mass. 188, 202, 36 N.E. 795, 796 (1894); Hudson County
Nat'l Bank v. Woodruff, 122 N.J. Eq. 444, 451, 194 A. 266, 270 (Ch. Ct. 1937).
108 3 A. ScoTT, supra note 10, § 239.4, at 1874.
109 Id.
110 Commissioners" Prefatory Note to Umomv PaIciPAL AND IxcoE AcT
(1931), 9B UNwomv LAWS ANN. 586 (1966).
* Member, Second Year Class.
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